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A HISTORY OF TAX REGULATION PRIOR TO 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
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ABSTRACT 
  The relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to 
tax administration has been the subject of increasing scrutiny from 
scholars and courts. Some of this scrutiny has critiqued the long-held 
view of the Department of Treasury that tax regulations issued under 
the general grant of authority in I.R.C. § 7805(a) are interpretative 
regulations within the meaning of the APA.  This Article reviews the 
almost 150-year history of tax administration before the enactment of 
the APA to show the origins and basis for this long-held view. The 
Article also argues that the application of the general terms of the 
APA to tax administration must be informed by this pre–APA history 
of tax regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2014 Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Symposium is 
titled “Taking Administrative Law to Tax.” The title flows from some 
excellent recent scholarship that properly urges those who study and 
practice tax administration to be more aware of general 
administrative-law principles. This same scholarship, however, has 
created a constraining conceptual box labeled “tax exceptionalism.” 
The idea is that tax administration has been granted exceptional 
treatment in the application of the law and thus now operates outside 
the bounds of administrative law in general and the Administrative 
Procedure Act1 (APA) in particular. 
This Article pushes back. This Symposium could have been titled 
“Taking Tax to Administrative Law.” As this Article argues, general 
principles of administrative law can be, and indeed since the early 
nineteenth century have been, informed by the particulars of tax 
administration. The APA contains general commands about how 
agencies must make rules. Surely no one doubts that the APA applies 
to the agencies charged with administering tax laws. But the APA is 
neither the source nor the summation of administrative-law 
principles. An exploration of pre–APA administrative law helps to 
understand both what the law is and what the law should be. 
Professors Jerry Mashaw and Ann Woolhandler, among others, have 
studied early administrative law on a broader scale.2 Their studies, 
however, do not give much attention to tax administration. Thus this 
study fills a bit of a gap there as well. 
The goal of this Article is to reorient the discussion about the 
relationship of tax administration and administrative law away from 
metaphysical abstractions about legislative rules and interpretative 
rules and toward a more concrete understanding of where those terms 
came from. This Article’s review of the intellectual history of tax 
administration may help general administrative-law scholars and 
 
 1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 2. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative 
Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinafter Mashaw, 
Administration and “The Democracy”]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal 
Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 
(2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists]; Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1991).  
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others at least start in the right place. Part I delineates the current tax 
exceptionalism claim to which this Article responds. Parts II and III 
then review the legal history of tax administration up to the APA to 
show how the idea of tax regulations evolved and suggest why it was 
commonly believed that the APA requirements of notice and 
comment did not generally apply to tax regulations. 
I.  THE GUIDANCE PROBLEM AND THE TAX- 
EXCEPTIONALISM CLAIM 
A. The Problems of Issuance and Authority 
An important part of any agency’s work is to guide employees, as 
well as the regulated community, on how to both apply and comply 
with the law the agency administers.3 Agency guidance includes a 
variety of documents meant for internal or external use, some labeled 
“regulations” and some given other labels. However denominated, 
this guidance presents problems both of issuance and authority. The 
first problem concerns how an agency must publicize and disseminate 
the rules for compliance. The second problem concerns how courts 
should review guidance when someone disputes its validity. Problems 
of issuance and authority are present both in administrative law 
generally and in tax law in particular. 
Contrary to popular belief, the Internal Revenue Service 
(Service) is not the agency Congress made responsible for 
administering the tax laws. Rather, Congress has placed the awesome 
responsibility of administering the entire tax system on the Secretary 
of the Treasury (Secretary)4—and with that awesome responsibility 
comes awesome powers. Every Secretary since Alexander Hamilton, 
however, has delegated those powers to a spectrum of subordinates.5 
Since 18626 one of those subordinates has been the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue (Commissioner), whose position is currently 
 
 3. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (describing the authority of agencies to “elucidate a specific provision of [a] statute by 
regulation”). Although agencies exercise many different powers, this Article focuses on their 
power to issue guidance. Agency power to adjudicate is the other main branch of study in 
administrative law. This Article does not consider that subject. 
 4. I.R.C. § 7801(a)(1) (2012). 
 5. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text; see also Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, 
supra note 2, at 1669 (discussing how, in the early operation of the Treasury Department, 
Secretary Gallatin used circulars to delegate authority to the collectors, among other purposes). 
 6. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432–33. 
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codified at § 7803 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).7 
I.R.C. § 7803, however, generally grants the Commissioner only the 
“duties and powers as the Secretary may prescribe.”8 The Secretary 
has broadly delegated to the Commissioner the responsibility “for the 
administration and enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws.”9 In 
turn, the Commissioner has delegated some of these responsibilities 
to other subordinates.10 
With the authority to administer and enforce comes the authority 
to issue guidance. Congress has given general authority to the 
Secretary to make “all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of this title.”11 In addition, Congress has specifically 
reiterated the Secretary’s power to make rules in hundreds of specific 
sections of the I.R.C.12 With thousands of separate sections in the 
I.R.C. to administer and approximately one hundred thousand 
employees to administer them, the number and variety of guidance 
documents is overwhelming and constantly changing. At any one time 
there are between ten and twenty categories of documents that are 
used by Service employees and the public to guide their 
understanding of and compliance with the tax laws.13 
Most of these guidance documents are issued by offices within 
the Service. Typical of these are revenue rulings, revenue procedures, 
service announcements, Office of Chief Counsel notices, actions on 
decision, general counsel memoranda, forms, form instructions, 
publications, and that capacious compendium containing reams of 
 
 7. I.R.C. § 7803(a) (2012).  
 8. Id. § 7803(a)(2). 
 9. I.R.S. Treas. Order 150-10 (Apr. 22, 1982), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/
role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/to150-10.aspx. 
 10. The Commissioner’s delegation of various powers to various subordinates are collected 
and published in the Internal Revenue Manual. See IRM 1.2.40–.64. 
 11. I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 12. Professor John Coverdale writes that there are more than a thousand such sections. 
John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 52 (1995). Professor Kristin Hickman writes that there are several 
hundred. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1735 & nn.37–38 (2007) (citing her own search, which resulted in 293 such grants of 
authority, and another study, which claimed over 550 hits). 
 13. See Peter A. Lowy, U.S. Federal Tax Research, 100-2d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) A-
23 (2011) (“The body of guidance emanating from the IRS is a constantly changing collection of 
documents. At any one time, it may include anywhere from 10–20 different types and forms of 
guidance, like revenue rulings, general counsel memoranda, field service advice, and 
publications.”).  
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rules, the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). Some of these office 
documents are meant for public use. Others are written for internal 
use but are made public thanks to the tireless efforts of the nonprofit 
organization Tax Analysts, Inc.14 
One important subset of guidance documents, Treasury 
Regulations, are issued only after the review and approval of U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) personnel outside the 
Service.15 Treasury Regulations are drafted by attorneys in the Office 
of Chief Counsel of the Service in coordination with the various 
Service offices affected by the subject matter of the regulation.16 
These regulations are not promulgated, however, until they are 
substantively reviewed by personnel within Treasury, a process that 
ends only with the decision of the Secretary.17 One common mistake is 
to refer to Treasury Regulations as “IRS regulations.”18 This habit 
creates potentially unreliable analyses of administrative-law concerns 
and overlooks a potentially useful functional distinction between 
types of guidance documents. 
 
 14. Tax Analysts is a nonprofit organization that has sued the government multiple times 
to secure the release of “secret” law in the form of internal memoranda. History of Tax 
Analysts, TAX ANALYSTS, http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/website.nsf/Web/HistoryOfTax
Analysts (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
 15. For an overview of the entire process through which Treasury Regulations are 
implemented, see 1 MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 3.02[2] (rev. 2d 
ed. 2005).  
 16. See IRM 32.1.1.4.4 (Aug. 11, 2004) (“The Office of Associate Chief Counsel is solely 
responsible for issuing published guidance. However, on some projects, members of Operating 
Divisions may be involved in the development of a project.”); see also Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a) 
(as amended in 1987) (“Regulations . . . are prepared in the Office of the Chief Counsel.”).   
 17. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a) (“The most important rules are issued as regulations and 
Treasury decisions prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary or his 
delegate. . . . After approval by the Commissioner, regulations and Treasury decisions are 
forwarded to the Secretary or his delegate for further consideration and final approval.”).   
 18. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS 
Regulations, 136 TAX NOTES 271, 274 (2012) (discussing the decision in Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), but referring to the 
Treasury Regulations at issue there as “IRS regulations”). Experienced federal district judges 
also misuse the term. See, e.g., Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-0623 (PLF), 2014 WL 129023, at *28 
(D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (“[P]laintiffs here bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a final agency 
rule, rather than individualized adjudications of tax liability. The dispute before the Court is 
purely legal and ripe for review. Any administrative challenge would be futile, as the Secretary 
of the Treasury can be expected to deny plaintiffs’ complaint as contrary to the issued IRS 
regulations.”). There are indeed “IRS regulations.” That is, the Service does issue guidance 
without the review and approval of Treasury, which is published in the Federal Register and the 
Code of Federal Regulations. This guidance is labeled “Procedural Rules” and is found in Part 
601 of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
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However denominated, all of these tax guidance documents are 
“rules” under the APA. That is because the APA definition of rule is 
exceedingly broad: a rule is any “agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”19 Though the APA separates 
rules into various subclassifications—policy statements or 
interpretative rules, for example—the broad definition of rule sweeps 
every conceivable agency guidance document within the ambit of the 
APA’s operation. 
B. Issuance, Authority, and the New Orthodoxy 
Both courts and commentators have claimed that tax-guidance 
documents—most notably Treasury Regulations—have erroneously 
escaped application of general administrative-law principles, as to 
both issuance and authority. This critique, though not without its 
precursors, has become something of a new orthodoxy among tax 
scholars and courts. 
1. Recent Examples.  Most recent examples of this phenomenon 
deal with the problem of authority. The Supreme Court, for instance, 
addressed the authority problem in the 2011 case Mayo Foundation 
for Medical Education & Research v. United States.20 There, the 
taxpayer argued that the Supreme Court should evaluate a Treasury 
Regulation under a standard of deference the Court had articulated 
specifically for tax regulations in National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. 
United States.21 The Court instead decided to use Chevron deference, 
the same standard used to evaluate regulations from other agencies.22 
The Court’s opinion noted that the taxpayer “has not advanced any 
justification for applying a less deferential standard of review to 
Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any 
other agency.”23 Without such justification, the Court was “not 
 
 19. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012); cf. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund 
Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that a Service notice violated the 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for rules). 
 20. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. 704. 
 21. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).  
 22. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714. 
 23. Id. at 713. 
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inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for 
tax law only.”24 
Commentators have lauded the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision 
for “dispos[ing] of tax exceptionalism, the notion that tax 
administration is exempt from the rules governing other areas of 
regulation.”25 Pointing to Mayo, Professor Steve Johnson has argued 
that courts should evaluate the recent attempt to regulate tax-return 
preparers by the same standards used to review the attempts of other 
agencies to change long-held interpretations of statutes, such as the 
Food and Drug Administration’s attempt to regulate tobacco.26  
As to the problem of issuance, Professor Kristin Hickman’s 2007 
study of 232 tax regulations has convinced her that tax regulations are 
routinely issued in violation of the APA under what she characterizes 
as misguided claims for exceptional treatment.27 She has since 
followed up with a careful study of the force-of-law concept to 
identify when tax regulations must follow the APA notice-and-
comment process.28 
More recently, the D.C. Circuit has joined the tax-exceptionalism 
parade. In Cohen v. United States,29 the court decided that there is 
nothing special enough about tax administration to justify 
reading § 702 of the APA any differently for suits challenging tax 
regulations than other types of regulations.30 In Cohen, taxpayers 
asked the court to invalidate a refund procedure the Service had 
 
 24. Id. Apparently the Supreme Court had not read Professor John Coverdale’s excellent 
article on just this point. See generally Coverdale, supra note 12 (arguing against the Chevron 
standard and for an administrative review specific to tax law only). 
 25. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. 
TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012). 
 26. Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation, 
60 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 66–70), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326526; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 142–43 (2000) (invalidating the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products). 
 27. Hickman, supra note 12, at 1728–31. Most of the violations Professor Hickman finds 
relate to the immediate issuance of temporary regulations. Id. at 1759. She explores the 
historical justifications the Treasury has given for its issuing temporary regulations without 
notice and comment and concludes that these are claims for exceptional treatment that do not 
survive critical study. See id. at 1759–86.  
 28. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 542 
(2013). 
 29. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 30. Id. at 723.  
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created and announced in a document called “Notice 2006–50”31 on 
the grounds that it “did not comply with the notice and comment 
procedures required under the [APA].”32 The en banc majority first 
rejected the government’s attempt to assert sovereign immunity, 
albeit not with the clearest syntax: “The IRS is not special in this 
regard; no exception exists shielding it—unlike the rest of the Federal 
Government—from suit under the APA.”33 It then turned to the 
government’s argument that the taxpayers should do exactly what 
taxpayers have traditionally had to do: file a refund claim, then test 
the Service’s denial of the claim in court.34 Siding with the taxpayers, 
the court drew on general administrative-law precedents to hold that 
because the taxpayers’ challenge was to the adequacy of the IRS’s 
procedures, they need not overcome an exhaustion requirement to 
obtain equitable relief.35 
The court of appeals went on to find that Notice 2006–50 
operated as a substantive rule because it was “bind[ing]” on the IRS 
and taxpayers alike.36 On remand, the District Court used that finding 
to hold that Notice 2006–50 should have been promulgated as a 
regulation using notice and comment procedures.37  
This is the new orthodoxy: it is wrong to treat tax administration 
differently from the work of other administrative agencies. There is 
no better evidence of orthodoxy than to find the idea encapsulated in 
a student note that dutifully summarizes the story this way: “For 
years, generally applicable administrative law was not applied to 
taxation under the doctrine of tax exceptionalism.”38  
 
 31. Id. at 720–21; see generally I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141 (describing the 
reasons for the refund and procedures for obtaining one). 
 32. Cohen, 650 F.3d at 721. The taxpayers also challenged Notice 2006–50 as being 
“substantively flawed because it undercompensates many taxpayers for the actual excise taxes 
paid.” Id. 
 33. Id. at 723. The D.C. Circuit chided the government for its tax administration insularity: 
“The IRS envisions a world in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of 
its taxing authority.” Id. at 726.  
 34. Id. at 731. 
 35. See id. at 731–33 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147–49 (1992); Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 60–62 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1973)). 
 36. Id. at 723. 
 37. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 143 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
 38. Recent Case, Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1747 (2013).  
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2. Precursors to the New Orthodoxy.  The current crop of critics 
is not the first to caution tax lawyers about the need to understand 
more general principles of administrative law, as to either the 
problem of issuance or the problem of authority. In 1926, writing in 
National Income Tax Magazine, attorney J. Hardy Patten started off 
his three-part study of judicial review of tax regulations with the 
observation that “there is no field in which the scope and extent of 
court review is so unsettled as in internal revenue taxation.”39 He 
urged his readers to remember that tax administration “has as its 
background the application of the basic principles of administrative 
and constitutional law” and that these areas of law were “too often 
neglected by the practicing tax lawyer.”40 
Similarly, some fifteen years after Patten first explored the 
problem, eminent scholars debated what they termed “the regulations 
problem,”41 that is, “the problem of the effect which should be given 
to Treasury Regulations in the construction and application of the 
Federal Revenue Acts.”42 Much of this debate was over the usefulness 
of the reenactment doctrine, which seemed exceptionally applicable 
to tax administration due to the frequency of congressional 
reenactment of taxing statutes in the years before codification.43 
3. A Critique.  The new orthodoxy is troublesome to me because 
it skews the relationship between the APA and the organic statute—
here, the I.R.C.—by assuming that the APA is the proper starting 
point for determining the proper relationship between tax and 
administrative law. That is, scholars start their analyses with the 
APA. They then tend to measure the compliance of tax 
administration with “administrative law” by its compliance with 
 
 39. J. Hardy Patten, Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations, 4 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 
373, 373 (1926).  
 40. Id. 
 41. Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398, 400 
(1941). 
 42. Id. at 398; see also A.H. Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. 
REV. 1311 (1941) (responding to Professor Erwin Griswold’s article); cf. Louis Eisenstein, Some 
Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. REV. 477, 535 (1945) (“[T]he 
present state of administrative paralysis is attributable . . . to a variety of interlocking factors, 
such as the concept of specific legislative intention, the virtual delegation of administrative 
power to the courts, and an awkward system of appellate review which is conducive to confusion 
rather than administration.”). 
 43. See Feller, supra note 42, at 1314 (“The factor which differentiates tax administration is 
the periodic reenactment of the basic statute.”). For further discussion, see infra notes 209–13 
and accompanying text. 
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specific provisions of the APA. Only then do they look to see 
whether the organic statute trumps the APA. In short, these scholars 
use a top-down approach that presumes that the APA is the primary 
source of law regulating administrative behavior, and they fail to 
consider what came before the APA.44 
One example of this approach is Professor Hickman’s close study 
of Treasury Regulations.45 Hickman studies 232 separate Treasury 
regulatory projects and concludes that “[a]lmost as often as not, 
Treasury does not follow the traditional APA-required pattern of 
issuing [a notice of proposed rulemaking], accepting and considering 
public comments, and only then publishing its final regulations.”46 She 
comes to this conclusion by counting how many of the regulatory 
projects used the APA’s traditional notice-and-comment process.47 
She then examines those projects that did not use the notice-and-
comment process to see whether they fell within any of the statutory 
exceptions created by the APA.48 She carefully considers what she 
calls the “interpretive rule exception,” the “procedural rule 
exception,” and the “good cause exception,” and concludes that none 
apply.49  
Professor Hickman’s study relies on the notion that “[t]he APA 
is the law.”50 She starts with the APA as her baseline. Only then does 
she consider provisions in the I.R.C. that, in her view, “supplement 
APA section 553.”51 Notably, she considers I.R.C. § 7805—a general 
grant of rulemaking authority—and questions whether that section 
gives an “I.R.C.-specific departure from APA rulemaking 
requirements.”52 In particular she examines whether § 7805(e) 
represents “a tax-specific exception from APA rulemaking 
requirements”53 and concludes it does not. 
 
 44. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 499, 572 (2011) (“In view of these legislative balances, whether agency-specific 
precedents are legally justified depends on the extent to which distinctive features of the agency 
justify deviation or variation from the consistent and universal application of the APA and 
other generally applicable administrative law.”). 
 45. See generally Hickman, supra note 12. 
 46. Id. at 1730. 
 47. Id. at 1730, 1744–48. 
 48. Id. at 1745. 
 49. See id. at 1760, 1773, 1778, 1786. 
 50. Id. at 1795 (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 1735. 
 52. Id. at 1738. 
 53. Id. at 1740. 
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Professor Leandra Lederman follows the same reasoning in her 
study of what deference courts owe to “‘fighting’ regulation[s]”—that 
is, those regulations promulgated during litigation and then used as a 
sword in the litigation.54 Lederman aims to compare deference 
standards for regulations generally with deference standards for tax 
regulations.55 She begins her analysis with the claim that 
“administrative law recognizes two categories of rules—legislative 
and interpretative—that receive different levels of deference.”56 She 
locates that distinction, however, in the APA, which is the starting 
point for her inquiry.57 
Certainly some scholars have argued vigorously that the APA 
should be the sum and substance of administrative law.58 I disagree, at 
least with respect to tax administration. Analysis of tax guidance—
whether considering how guidance should be issued or how courts 
should weigh it—should not start with the APA. Instead, the proper 
place to start is with the precedents established in tax-administration 
cases.59 Though the APA is a law, it is not the law. The APA was built 
on already existing concepts, notably the concepts of legislative 
 
 54. Leandra Lederman, The Fight over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax 
Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 648 (2012). 
 55. Id. at 649. 
 56. Id. It is interesting that the earliest cases I could find in which a federal court used the 
exact term “interpretative regulation” came in pre–APA tax cases. See Comm’r v. Bryn Mawr 
Trust Co., 87 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1936) (“It will thus be seen that two Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have interpreted the statute to refer only to a consideration benefiting the decedent 
and have in effect added to the statutory definition of consideration the clause ‘received 
therefor by the decedent’ which the Commissioner actually did add to his interpretative 
regulation.”); see also Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 113–14 (1939) 
(holding that the term “gross income” was “so general in its terms as to render an interpretative 
regulation appropriate”). 
 57. See Lederman, supra note 54, at 649 (“Under current law, the [APA] is the principal 
source of the legislative/interpretative distinction.” (footnote omitted)).  
 58. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 113, 115 (1998). Professor John Duffy argues descriptively that “this administrative 
common law of judicial review is beginning to abate; it is being replaced, albeit slowly, by 
doctrine grounded in the judicial review provisions of the APA and other statutes.” Id. He also 
argues that the move from common law to statutory law is, in general, a good thing. Id. 
 59. I thus disagree with Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman’s intriguing article 
to the extent that it suggests that agency-specific precedent is undesirable. Cf. Levy & 
Glicksman, supra note 44, at 500 (“The proliferation of agency-specific precedents creates 
anomalies and inconsistencies in some cases and hampers the development of administrative 
law in others.”). I instead join those who believe that application of general principles of 
administrative law will look different when applied to different agencies.  
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regulations and interpretative regulations.60 These concepts came into 
the law influenced by the history of tax guidance. 
Unlike these past attempts to reconcile tax administration with 
principles of administrative law, the new orthodoxy is troublesome in 
no small part because it skews the relationship between the APA and 
the organic statute by overlooking the history of tax-guidance 
doctrines. By taking administrative law to tax—that is, by starting 
with the APA and only then looking to see whether tax guidance is 
special—the new orthodoxy risks distorting the proper relationship 
between tax administration and general administrative-law principles. 
The world of the APA started in 1947,61 but the world of U.S. tax 
administration began in 1789.62 An understanding of that history is 
necessary for a proper understanding of the relationship between 
administrative law and tax. The next section seeks to explain that 
history. 
 
 60. I use the word “interpretative” as a complete synonym with “interpretive.” I have 
always wondered why the APA uses the five-syllable word instead of the four-syllable word. 
There is no explanation for the choice of terminology in either the Attorney General’s Final 
Report on the APA, see ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941), or the 
Attorney General’s Manual, see TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947). Judge Milton 
Shadur concluded in 1988 that it was just a stylistic point. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 
688 F. Supp. 358, 361 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1988). I agree. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century courts 
used the word “interpretative” as a synonym for “constructive,” as in “[c]onstructive, or 
interpretative treasons.” United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277, 1279 (Paterson, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,788). It was also used as a more direct synonym for 
“interpretive” in describing the ability of courts to construe a statute. See, e.g., Trs. of the Phila. 
Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Ex’rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 18 (1819), overruled by Vidal v. Girard’s 
Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). For example, Hart’s Executors involved the question of 
whether an English statute, repealed after the creation of a will, could save a bequest that would 
be void but for operation of the statute. Id. at 2–3. The Court there asked, “If, then, the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over charitable bequests, cannot be derived from the letter 
of the statute of Eliz., can it be supported from ancient adjudged cases, interpretative of that 
statute?” Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added). In the latter part of the nineteenth century 
“interpretative” appeared mostly in patent disputes, in which courts asked what interpretative 
effect various phrases used in patent claims have on the scope of the patent protection. See, e.g., 
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Sterling Cork & Seal Co., 217 F. 381, 387 (6th Cir. 1914). Only in a 
few cases, however, was the term “interpretative” used in the sense we think of “interpretive” in 
today’s administrative-law lexicon—as a term to describe a power that is not legislative power. 
See, e.g., The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 61–62 (1821) (“[The Court’s] province is 
interpretative, as in the case of other laws and it can no more assume the treaty-making power, 
than any other legislative power.”). 
 61. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)). 
 62. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.  
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II.  TAX GUIDANCE FROM 1789 TO 1862 
It is commonly assumed that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), established in 1887,63 was the first regulatory 
agency.64 This assumption is correct in the important sense that tax 
administration is not the same kind of “regulation” as that done by 
the ICC and other agencies created after 1887. Moreover, the very 
existence of this assumption reinforces one of the points this Article 
seeks to make: tax is different. 
This assumption is incorrect, however, in the nontrivial sense 
that it undervalues tax administration’s pre–Civil War impact on the 
development of general administrative-law principles. 
One significant administrative-law development prior to the Civil 
War was the explicit acknowledgement that administrative 
departments could issue regulations. Tax law played an important 
role in how courts worked out the legal effect of such administrative 
regulations.65  
Between 1789 and 1862, Congress filled the federal fisc mainly 
through external taxes, in the form of tariffs, or customs duties, 
imposed on imported goods.66 Congress divided the country into 
 
 63. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383. 
 64. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 950 (2011) (“The 
creation in 1887 of the first major national regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, reflected a similar pattern.”). This is a longstanding assumption. See Frederic P. 
Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. L.J. 287, 297 (1948) 
(“In 1887 [Congress] entered on a program of vesting the executive with broad regulatory 
powers over economic and social matters of national concern, and enacted the original 
Interstate Commerce Act. During the half century and more since that date a network of 
important economic and social regulatory measures has been spread over the pages of the 
Statutes at Large.”). 
 65. It appears, in fact, that until the mid-twentieth century, the usual association of the 
term “regulation” was with statutory provisions and not administrative rules. For example, 
section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1789 provided: “[I]t shall be the duty of the collector to receive all 
reports, manifests and documents made or exhibited to him by the master or commander of any 
ship or vessel, conformably to the regulations prescribed by this act.” Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 
5, § 5, 1 Stat. 29, 36. 
 66. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1945, at 295–98 ser. P 89–98 (1949). My thanks to the Duke Law 
Journal editors who ran this table through a spreadsheet to calculate that tariffs made up 
approximately 85 percent of federal revenue until the Civil War. The table shows that the other 
15 percent came mostly from land sales. For a short period of time, Congress did impose some 
modest internal excise taxes on those who produced certain tobacco and alcohol products. See 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 246 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & 
Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005). As I learned in sixth grade, the farmers of the Whiskey 
CAMP FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:10 AM 
1686 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1673 
collection districts, each one headed by a collector of customs, 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.67 These taxes were collected based on identification and 
valuation of the goods subject to tax.68  
Early tariff administration was chiefly regulated by statute, and 
not by what we would now consider administrative regulations.69 The 
First Congress filled twenty pages in the Statutes at Large with 
detailed instructions on tariff administration.70 Within days of his 
confirmation as the first Secretary in 1789, Alexander Hamilton was 
writing letters to various collectors of customs, giving directions.71 
These handwritten letters were meant to be circulated to all other 
collectors and thus were titled “circulars.”72 In response to some 
doubt over Hamilton’s authority, Congress provided in the Tariff Act 
of 179273 “[t]hat the Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the 
superintendence of the collection of the duties on impost and tonnage 
as he shall judge best.”74 This was the only statutory direction given as 
to the scope of administrative power over taxes that I found before 
1832. 
Hamilton issued over sixty circulars during his time in office.75 
However, they appear to have had little effect on the day-to-day 
operations of tax.76 Actual implementation of the circulars tended to 
be local, with each collector “allowed to use his own common sense 
 
Rebellion did not think these excise taxes so modest. MARGARET G. MACKEY, YOUR 
COUNTRY’S HISTORY 173 (1966). 
 67. John Dean Goss, A History of Tariff Administration in the United States, from Colonial 
Times to the McKinley Administration Bill, in 1 STUDIES IN HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
LAW 75, 98–99 (N.Y., Columbia Univ. 2d ed. 1897).  
 68. See Act of July 31, 1789 § 5, 1 Stat. at 43. 
 69. Even the term “regulation” tended to refer to statutes. See infra note 120. 
 70. See Act of July 31, 1789 §§ 1–40, 1 Stat. at 29–49. 
 71. See PAUL LEICESTER FORD, A LIST OF TREASURY REPORTS AND CIRCULARS ISSUED 
BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1789–1795, at 3–4 (Brooklyn 1886) (listing several circulars that 
Alexander Hamilton sent within a month of his confirmation). Alexander Hamilton’s 
appointment was confirmed on September 11, 1789. RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, AMERICAN 80 (2011).  
 72. For a reprinting of one so titled, see BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. 
TREASURY DEP’T, THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 9 
(1948). 
 73. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, 1 Stat. 279. 
 74. Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 280. 
 75. See generally FORD, supra note 71.  
 76. Professors Jerry Mashaw and Avi Perry agree with this evaluation. Jerry L. Mashaw & 
Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 7, 14.  
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and business ability with regard to the direction of office methods and 
details of the administration, and [to] please himself as to the forms of 
most of the documents . . . required to pass through his hands.”77  
The first explicit authorization for Treasury to issue guidance 
called “regulations” was hedged with qualifications. Congress 
reorganized the country’s tariff administration in the Tariff Act of 
1832,78 a lesser known aspect of the great Nullification Crisis.79 The 
language in the Tariff Act of 1832 is notable for its caution. First, 
although the grant of authority allowed the Secretary to “establish 
such rules and regulations . . . as the President of the United States 
shall think proper,” that authority could not be exercised in a manner 
“inconsistent with the laws of the United States.”80 Second, the grant 
of authority was not just to the Secretary alone but was to “the 
Secretary of the Treasury, under the direction of the President.”81 
Third, along with the authority to establish “rules and regulations,” 
Congress imposed the “duty . . . to report all such rules and 
regulations, with the reasons therefor, to the then next session of 
Congress.”82 
It was not immediately clear what the Tariff Act of 1832 added 
to the Secretary’s authority to issue tax guidance. Both before and 
after its adoption, when there arose questions about the 
implementation of the tariff laws, collectors would write to the 
 
 77. Goss, supra note 67, at 102.  
 78. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583. 
 79. For the standard description of the Nullification Crisis, see REBECCA BROOKS 
GRUVER, AN AMERICAN HISTORY 353–54, 372–77 (1972). The Tariff Act of 1832 was set to 
take effect in March 1833. Act of July 14 § 2, 4 Stat. at 583. Its substantive provisions, however, 
never went into effect because of blowback from various states. See WILLIAM MCKINLEY, THE 
TARIFF IN THE DAYS OF HENRY CLAY AND SINCE: AN EXHAUSTIVE REVIEW OF OUR TARIFF 
LEGISLATION FROM 1812 TO 1896, at 1–11 (N.Y., Henry Clay Publ’g Co. 1896); F.W. TAUSSIG, 
THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 109–12 (8th ed. 1964). The Compromise Tariff 
of March 2, 1833, was, officially, just a modification of the new administrative structure created 
by the Tariff Act of 1832 (the official title of the Compromise Tariff was “[a]n Act to modify the 
act of the fourteenth of July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and all other acts 
imposing duties on imports”). See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629, 629. Thus, although 
the substantive provisions of the Tariff Act of 1832 never went into effect, the administrative 
provisions were carried forward, unchanged, into the Compromise Tariff. See Act of Aug. 30, 
1842, ch. 270, § 26, 5 Stat. 548, 566; see also Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9 (1845) (discussing the 
relationship between the Tariff Act of 1832 and the Tariff Act of 1842). 
 80. Act of July 14, 1832 § 9, 4 Stat. at 592. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
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Secretary and ask for his decision on the matter.83 The reply would 
often take the form of a circular and thus grew the idea of a Treasury 
“decision.”84 Why would collectors actually want, much less ask the 
Secretary for, direction and supervision of their fiefdoms? The reason 
is the oldest rule of bureaucracies: CYA. Collectors could raise the 
Treasury Decisions as a liability shield against taxpayer suits. 
Being sued by taxpayers came with the job of being a collector.85 
In theory, the official method for taxpayers to contest a tariff was to 
give a bond for payment to the collector, then renege on the bond; 
only then, when the collector sued on the bond, could the taxpayer 
litigate the dispute.86 In practice, taxpayers early on convinced courts 
that if they paid the collected tax they could file a common-law action 
for assumpsit against the collector personally, because no suits would 
lie against the sovereign United States.87 The Supreme Court 
 
 83. For example, in a Circular dated August 27, 1792, Alexander Hamilton gave his 
decision on the “true construction” of the law to resolve a reported “difference of opinion 
between the Collectors and Supervisors.” BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY 
DEP’T, THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 9 (1948).  
 84.  For an example of collector–Secretary dialogue, see Professor Mashaw’s discussion of 
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallitan’s use of circulars to administer the Embargo of 1807. See 
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 2, at 1668 (“The Treasury Department was also in 
daily correspondence with the collectors. Specific questions regarding permits, detentions, and 
interpretations of the embargo laws were sent to Gallatin, who responded with binding advisory 
letters . . . .”). 
 85. For example, in the three-year period during which Jesse Hoyt was the collector for the 
Port of New York, from 1838 until 1841, see Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 109, 132 
(1850), he was sued multiple times. E.g., Hardy v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 292 (1839); Bend v. 
Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839); Hughes v. Hoyt, 12 F. Cas. 836 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1839) (No. 
6846); Dorr v. Hoyt, 7 F. Cas. 926 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 4007); Hadden v. Hoyt, 11 F. Cas. 
147 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 5891); Hall v. Hoyt, 11 F. Cas. 226 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 
5934). 
 86. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 627, 676–77 (outlining the procedures for 
initiating a suit for the nonpayment of a bond and challenging the underlying assessment). 
Taxpayers could also find a friendly congressman and get relief in a private bill. See Richard H. 
Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the 
Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 175 (1998) (“Before the 
middle of the nineteenth century, contract claims directly against the federal government were 
barred by sovereign immunity and contract claims against federal officers would not lie. Unable 
to get relief in the courts, individuals with federal contract claims frequently petitioned 
Congress for private bills as an alternative.”). 
 87. See William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 685, 685–88 (1947). Because taxpayers tended to sue in state courts, Congress 
passed the Force Act in 1833 that not only gave federal courts jurisdiction over such actions 
regardless of diversity of citizenship but also allowed collectors to remove state-filed cases to 
federal court. Force Act of 1833, ch. 57, §§ 2–3, 4 Stat. 632, 633–34. Otherwise, federal courts 
would not have had subject-matter jurisdiction when the taxpayer and the collector were from 
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approved this practice in 1836, so long as taxpayers paid under 
explicit protest and permitted the collector to hold back the money 
from Treasury in anticipation of the personal suit.88 The problem of 
collectors holding back money, however, quickly became so great that 
Congress created a statutory duty to turn over the money to 
Treasury.89  
Collectors embraced the concept of Treasury guidance when 
they could use it as a shield in litigation. For example, Tracy v. 
Swartwout90 involved a dispute about a bond. F.A. Tracy and other 
merchants landed casks of syrup and tendered a bond of 15 percent of 
the value of the cargo to secure their promise to pay the import duty.91 
The Collector of the Port of New York, Samuel Swartwout, refused 
to accept the bond, “acting under the instructions of the Secretary of 
the Treasury.”92 His instructions from Treasury required him to 
demand a much larger bond because there was doubt as to whether 
the syrup was supposed to be taxed by its value or by its weight (three 
cents per pound).93 Tracy and the merchants refused to provide a 
larger bond, and the syrup sat deteriorating in storage for over 
 
the same state; modern federal-question jurisdiction was not available until 1875. Judiciary Act 
of 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1–2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)). 
 88. Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 154–55 (1836).  
 89. After Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836), collectors started holding back 
in earnest to protect themselves from suit and, for some, to enrich themselves personally. See 
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 243 (1845) (“It is matter of history that the alleged right to 
retain . . . had led to great abuses, and to much loss to the public; and it is to these two subjects, 
therefore, that the [1839] act of Congress particularly addresses itself.”). Money held back was 
money not getting to Treasury. Congress quickly revised tax procedure to require collectors to 
pay all collections to Treasury, even those made under protest and threat of suit. Act of Mar. 3, 
1839, ch. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 339, 348. At the same time, Congress authorized the Secretary to refund 
improperly collected money to taxpayers, but only when the taxpayers could show actual 
overpayment. Id., 5 Stat. at 348–49. Congress also created a statutory refund action, still 
nominally against the collector. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727, 727. Eventually, the 
Supreme Court recognized that action for what is really was, an action against the United 
States. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1915) (“The 
objection to the jurisdiction pressed by the Government is that the only remedy is a suit against 
the Collector. . . . However gradually the result may have been approached in the earlier cases it 
now has become accepted law that claims like the present are founded upon the revenue law.” 
(quotation marks omitted)). For full discussion of this transformation, see generally Plumb, 
supra note 87. 
 90. Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836). 
 91. Id. at 93. Apparently, Mr. Swartwout was something of a scoundrel in his own right. See 
Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy,” supra note 2, at 1686. 
 92. Tracy, 35 U.S. at 93. 
 93. Id. 
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eighteen months.94 Eventually, Swartwout received instructions to 
take the 15 percent bond.95 Tracy and the other merchants sued to 
recover for the damages for the lost syrup.96 
Swartwout trotted out the Treasury instructions to raise the 
classic “just following orders” defense.97 This worked well for him at 
the trial level. The court incorporated it into the jury instructions and, 
as a result, although the jury returned a verdict of nominal damages 
for the merchant (six cents), Swartwout escaped having to pay either 
compensatory or exemplary damages to the merchants.98 
The defense worked somewhat less well at the Supreme Court. 
The good news for Swartwout was the Court’s conclusion that a good-
faith reliance on Treasury instructions would protect him from 
exemplary damages.99 
The bad news, however, was the Court’s conclusion that the 
instructions could not shield him from compensatory damages.100 This 
was because “[t]he secretary of the treasury is bound by the law; and 
although in the exercise of his discretion he may adopt necessary 
forms and modes of giving effect to the law . . . , neither he nor those 
who act under him, can dispense with, or alter any of its provisions.”101 
The resulting liability did not trouble the Court because it believed 
that Swartwout would be indemnified by the federal government.102 
And indeed, per opinions of the Attorneys General over the years, 
there is evidence that indemnification of judgments was allowed out 
of general appropriations.103  
The Court’s reasoning in Tracy was that the administrative 
agency had the power to issue its own guidance—of course—as part 
 
 94. Id. at 82. 
 95. See id. at 93. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 82, 88.  
 98. Id. at 94. 
 99. Id. at 95. 
 100. Id. at 97, 99. 
 101. Id. at 95.  
 102. Id. at 98–99. 
 103. See Sec’y of the Navy To Satisfy a Judgment Against Commodore Elliott, 3 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 306, 306 (1838) (authorizing indemnification of a particular naval officer from general 
appropriations); see also Fees of Dist. Attorneys, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 146, 148 (1858) (“When a 
ministerial or executive officer is sued for an act done in the lawful discharge of his duty, the 
government which employed him is bound, in conscience and honor, to stand between him and 
the consequences. It will not suffer any personal detriment to come upon him for his fidelity, but 
will adopt his act as its own . . . .”).  
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of its job in carrying out the will of Congress, whether set out in 
circulars or letters or other documents. The Court gave no citation to 
statutory authority for none was needed. This guidance was either 
within the scope of the statutory law or outside its scope. Being 
outside the scope of the statute, however, did not make the guidance 
per se unlawful, for Swartwout was still bound to follow the guidance 
because it came from his supervisor. In other words, orders from 
above—even orders issued improperly or without authority—were 
binding on the collector. 
One sees this same conceptualization in Justice Woodbury’s 
opinion for the Court twelve years later in Greely v. Thompson.104  
The case involved iron imported from Wales that was to be assessed 
based on the iron’s value at the port of origin.105 In the time between 
purchase and loading, the price of iron had risen by one-fifth.106 The 
issue was whether Congress had required valuation to be the fair 
market value at the time of purchase or the fair market value at the 
time of loading.107 The statute was silent. Treasury had issued 
guidance to fill this statutory gap:108 it instructed appraisers to value 
cargo as of the date it was loaded onto the ship.109 
The Court, hewing to the traditional notion that courts say what 
the law is, made two points about Treasury guidance, however 
denominated. First, as to statutory interpretation, the Court 
explained: 
[The views] expressed in either letters or circulars, are entitled to 
much respect, and will always be duly weighed by this court; but it is 
the laws which are to govern, rather than their opinions of them, and 
importers, in cases of doubt, are entitled to have their right settled 
 
 104. Greely v. Thompson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 225 (1850). That Justice Woodbury voiced the 
opinion of the Court is noteworthy because he had served six years as Treasury Secretary under 
Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. CHARLES LEVI WOODBURY, MEMOIR OF 
HON. LEVI WOODBURY, LL.D. 5–6 (Bos., David Clapp & Son 1894). That, plus the fact that 
Chief Justice Roger Taney, too, had run Treasury, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY: 1646–1992, at 26 (1993), 
suggests that the Court was operating with some significant firsthand input on the 
administrative realities of the work done by Treasury. 
 105. Greely, 51 U.S. at 234–35. 
 106. Id. at 235. 
 107. Id. at 235–36 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1823, ch. 21, § 5, 3 Stat. 729, 732). 
 108. Id. at 236. 
 109. Id. 
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by the judicial exposition of those laws, rather than by the views of 
the Department.110 
The Court then flat out ignored the Treasury guidance and used the 
typical tools of statutory construction to conclude that the proper 
measure of fair market value was the time of purchase, not loading.111 
The Court’s second point, however, ameliorated the first. That is, 
the Court recognized that though the Treasury guidance was just an 
interpretation, it was an interpretation that would bind Treasury 
employees.112 The Court distinguished between the relationship of 
Treasury guidance to employees, on the one hand, and to taxpayers, 
on the other, noting that “as between the custom-house officers and 
the Department, the latter must by law control the course of 
proceeding, yet, as between them and the importer, it is well settled, 
that the legality of all their doings may be revised in the judicial 
tribunals.”113  
The 1850 Greely decision reflected not only the ideas in Tracy 
but also the intervening statutory developments. By 1842, the grant of 
authority to the Secretary to issue rules and regulations appeared 
problematic, so Congress added a “we really mean it” statute. The 
problem was that collectors would only follow Treasury Decisions 
when doing so helped protect them from liability; they ignored those 
Treasury Decisions that exposed them to greater liability. For 
example, after Tracy v. Swartwout allowed taxpayers to sue collectors 
if taxes were paid under protest, collectors became increasingly 
reluctant to turn over taxes to the government and repeatedly ignored 
instructions to do so.114 Even when collectors were willing to deposit 
monies in government accounts, it was unclear exactly where the 
government accounts were because of the collapse of the Second 
Bank of the United States.115 Treasury issued directives dealing with 
 
 110. Id. at 234. 
 111. Id. at 235–36. 
 112. Id. at 234. 
 113. Id. 
 114. One prominent example was Jesse Hoyt, the collector of the Port of New York, who 
refused to follow Treasury orders on how, where, and when to pay over the collected tariffs. See 
Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 109, 136–43 (1850). Hoyt had received a Treasury 
circular dated March 13, 1839, and had refused to follow its instructions, allegedly out of 
concern that he would not be indemnified if sued by unhappy taxpayers. Id. at 111–12. He just 
traded one suit for another. The government ended up suing him for over $200,000 in allegedly 
missing money. Id. at 138–39.  
 115. See Mashaw & Perry, supra note 76, at 24–25 (describing President Andrew Jackson’s 
ultimately successful attempt to transfer funds out of the Second Bank of the United States). 
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both of these problems, but many collectors balked at obeying 
them.116  
The “we really mean it” statute that Congress added in the Tariff 
Act of 1842117 placed collectors under an explicit statutory duty to 
“execute and carry into effect all instructions of the Secretary of the 
Treasury relative to the execution of the revenue laws.”118 It also 
explicitly gave the Secretary authority to interpret the law: “[I]n case 
any difficulty shall arise as to the true construction or meaning of any 
part of such revenue laws, the decision of the Secretary of the 
Treasury shall be conclusive and binding upon all such collectors and 
other officers of the customs.”119 
The Tariff Act of 1842 reinforced two important concepts about 
administrative regulation of the tax system. First, Treasury Decisions, 
issued under the general authority to regulate, were the approved 
modality for interpretation of the statutes. The idea was that Treasury 
had the power to interpret and that the form of the interpretation 
would be “the decision” of the Secretary.120 
Second, tax guidance was inward-looking, in that it was directed 
at the actions of Treasury employees and not at the actions of 
taxpayers. Specifically, Treasury Decisions regulated Treasury 
employees’ actions in administering the tariff laws, and not the 
actions of the taxpayers who were subject to tariff. That is, if a 
taxpayer wanted to import iron from Wales, nothing in the Treasury 
regulations could prohibit the ability to import or not to import. 
Although tax guidance might affect the cost of importation, taxing 
iron imports was qualitatively different than prohibiting them. In 
contrast, section 28 of the same Tariff Act of 1842 flat out prohibited 
“the importation of all indecent and obscene prints, paintings, 
 
 116. See supra note 89.  
 117. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 24, 5 Stat. 548. 
 118. Id. § 24, 5 Stat. at 566. 
 119. Id. 
 120. One caution here. In the nineteenth century, the term “regulations” often referred to 
statutes more than to administrative guidance. For example, the authority of Treasury 
“regulations” administering the Tariff Act of 1842 was at issue in Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 9 (1845). A central dispute in the case was the meaning of the statutory phrase from 
the Compromise Tariff, “regulations . . . prescribed by law.” Id. at 10, 13 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 
1833, ch. 55, § 3, 4 Stat. 629, 630). In Justice Taney’s opinion, “the most important regulations in 
relation to this part of the case are contained in the 7th, 8th and 9th sections of the act of July 
14, 1832.” Id. at 28. Justice Taney reasoned that these sections survived the Tariff Act of 1842. 
Id. He then used the ninth section’s authorization for the Secretary to issue rules and regulations 
to hold that the Treasury instructions issued under the Tariff Act of 1832 also survived. Id. at 29. 
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lithographs, engravings, and transparencies.”121 This prohibition 
regulated the actions of the taxpayers themselves, and directly 
affected their ability to import certain items.122 Guidance issued 
relative to that subject would be both inward-looking (because it 
would regulate Treasury employees) and outward-looking (because it 
would either allow or disallow specific taxpayer acts). 
III.  TAX GUIDANCE FROM 1862 TO THE APA 
Forget 1913.123 The watershed year for the history of internal 
taxation in the United States was 1862. That was when, in desperate 
need of revenue to fund the Civil War, Congress passed a revenue act 
of unprecedented scope and complexity.124 The Revenue Act of 1862125 
did not just toy with tariffs. It created a vast number of new internal 
taxes. These internal revenue taxes were paid not only by those who 
produced distilled spirits, but also by those who needed licenses126 and 
who produced myriad articles of commerce, everything from candles 
to cloth to pickles.127 Birthed along with this welter of new excise taxes 
was a new kind of tax called the income duty.128 It was just the runt of 
this litter; private compilations of the tax laws published over the next 
several years did not even have “income” in their titles.129 Few 
foresaw how big that runt would grow. 
 
 121. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 548, 566. 
 122. See Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 2, at 1647–50 (discussing Treasury’s 
implementation of the Embargo of 1807, in which both the law and the implementing rules 
affected the ability to import). 
 123. Underwood Tariff Act, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). 
 124. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432. As one commentator put it: “The Civil War 
revolutionized the financial methods of the United States.” TAUSSIG, supra note 79, at 155. 
Actually, 1862 was Congress’s second try. The act it passed the previous year, Act of Aug. 5, 
1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292, had so many problems that it never went into effect. See EDWIN R. A. 
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF 
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 435–36 (2d ed. 1914).  
 125. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432. 
 126. See id. § 39, 12 Stat. at 446–47 (giving collectors authority over licenses for distilling). 
 127. See id. § 75, 12 Stat. at 462–66 (listing articles of manufacture subject to taxes “to be 
paid by the producer or manufacturer thereof”). There were also excise taxes on auction sales, 
id. § 76, 12 Stat. at 466, carriages, id. § 77, 12 Stat. at 467, railroads and other common carriers, 
id. § 80, 12 Stat. at 468, and banks, id. § 82, 12 Stat. at 470. Two years later Congress even added 
a proto-VAT tax on the manufacture of furniture. Act of June 30, 1864 § 174, 13 Stat. at 267. 
 128. Id. §§ 89–93, 12 Stat. at 473–75. 
 129. See generally GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX 
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1863); CHARLES N. EMERSON, 
EMERSON’S INTERNAL REVENUE GUIDE, 1867 (Springfield, Mass., Samuel Bowles & Co. 1867); 
CHARLES F. ESTEE, THE EXCISE TAX LAW (N.Y., Fitch, Estee & Co. 1863). 
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To administer these myriad new internal taxes Congress created 
a new nationwide tax-administration structure, following the pattern 
of the prior tariff acts. The Revenue Act of 1862 divided up the 
nation into administrative districts and authorized the President to 
appoint a collector of internal revenue for each district—analogous to 
the collector of customs appointed for each port of entry—who in 
turn was authorized to hire assistants.130 It also created in each district 
the position of assessor,131 whose duty was to evaluate each taxpayer’s 
liability by reviewing each “list or return,” and on that basis assess 
taxes132 and give the resulting list to the collectors who then collected 
the tax.133 In this way, Congress separated the tax-determination 
function from the tax-collection function, a separation that remains a 
fundamental aspect of tax administration to this day and is part of 
what makes tax administration different from other regulatory 
regimes.134 
 
 130. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 2–5, 12 Stat. 432, 433–34; see also SELIGMAN, supra note 
124, at 435–40 (describing actual operation of the Revenue Act of 1862).  
 131. Act of July 1, 1862 § 2, 12 Stat. at 433. 
 132. Id. §§ 6–7, 12 Stat. at 434–35. 
 133. Id. § 16, 12 Stat. at 437–38. The statutes use the terms “list” and “return” 
interchangeably when discussing the document to be prepared by the taxpayer and given to the 
government. For clarity, I refer to all such documents as “returns” and reserve the term “list” 
for documents prepared by government employees. 
 134. See generally Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the 
Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1 
(2004) (explaining the difference and analyzing how the inquisitorial nature of both the tax 
determination and tax collection processes is in tension with traditional notions of adversarial 
justice) [hereinafter Camp, Tax Administration]; Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax 
Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227 (2009) (showing how the tax-determination function and 
tax-collection function have become depersonalized since World War II) [hereinafter Camp, 
Theory and Practice]. As I have written elsewhere: “This idea of tax determination as separate 
from the tax collection was thus built into the structure of the agency at its inception.” Camp, 
Theory and Practice, supra, at 231 n.16. One sees this in one of Commissioner George 
Boutwell’s earliest rulings, “that ‘no Revenue Agent or Inspector, Assessor or Assistant 
Assessor, possesses any authority of law to receive money or checks in payment of 
taxes . . . . Nor have Revenue Agents, Inspectors, Collectors, or Deputy Collectors any authority 
of law to estimate or fix the amount of tax due from any individual.’” Id. (quoting Treasury 
Circular 22, reprinted in EMERSON, supra note 129, at 13 n.†); see also Review, INTERNAL 
REVENUE REC. & CUSTOMS J., Mar. 3, 1866, at 73 (quoting the same language). The division of 
functions remains an important concept today. For example, I.R.C. § 7433 gives taxpayers a 
statutory cause of action for damages caused by wrongful collection. I.R.C. § 7433(a) (2012). 
Courts routinely limit this provision to the post-assessment phase of tax administration. See, e.g., 
Shaw v. United States, 20 F.3d 182 (1994) (“In this case, although the IRS improperly assessed 
tax liability against Mrs. Shaw, it did not engage in improper collection procedures. Thus, Mrs. 
Shaw cannot collect damages under § 7433.” (footnote omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 82-
2518, at 15–16 (1953) (explaining the division of function).   
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Along with a hugely expanded set of taxes and a national 
structure for their collection, Congress also created a new agency to 
supervise the collectors and assessors. Officially denominated the 
office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Congress placed it 
as a subordinate office within Treasury.135 Within a few years, the 
office became widely known as the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
(BIR),136 and eventually, in 1954, it was renamed the Internal 
Revenue Service.137 
On July 17, 1862, the BIR’s first Commissioner, the redoubtable 
George S. Boutwell, took office.138 Boutwell wasted little time 
ramping up operations. He started with just three clerks in July 
1862,139 but by the end of 1862 he was supervising 3,882 employees 
with all but sixty scattered throughout the non-rebelling states.140 As 
these numbers suggest, tax administration was in large part a field 
operation involving what one congressman denounced as an “army” 
of tax collectors.141 That army needed guidance. 
To meet that need, Congress gave general authority to the 
Commissioner to make “all the instructions, regulations, directions, 
forms, blanks, stamps, and licenses . . . which may be necessary to 
carry this act into effect.”142 Unlike the cautious language Congress 
 
 135. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432. 
 136. See BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 72, at 3–4 (suggesting reasons for the 
name change). 
 137. The 1954 name change resulted from a wholesale reorganization of the BIR in the 
wake of corruptions scandals. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 104, at 159. A good 
contemporary description of the changes can be found in HUGH C. BICKFORD, SUCCESSFUL 
TAX PRACTICE 183–202 (3d. ed. 1956). For a very nice history of various reforms in tax 
administration, see generally Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A 
Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717 (2001).  
 138. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 104, at 33. 
 139. BOUTWELL, supra note 129, at v. 
 140. Letter from George S. Boutwell, Comm’r of Internal Revenue, to S.P. Chase, Sec’y of 
the Treasury (Jan. 13, 1863), reprinted in ESTEE, supra note 129, at 309–10. After the income tax 
was allowed to expire in 1872, the number of personnel dropped considerably. See Camp, 
Theory and Practice, supra note 134, at 236. 
 141. During the debates over creating the system, Representative Roscoe Conkling of New 
York reflected the common view that “one of the most obnoxious—perhaps the most 
obnoxious—of all it features is that which creates an army of officers whose business it is to 
collect these taxes.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1861) (statement of Rep. 
Conkling). 
 142. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432–33. Later acts also contained “clean-
up” authority for the Commissioner and the Secretary. For example, section 174 of the Revenue 
Act of 1864 authorized the Commissioner, supervised by the Secretary, “to make all such 
regulations, not otherwise provided for, as may become necessary by reason of the alternation 
of the laws in relation to internal revenue, by virtue of this act.” Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 
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used when it gave the Secretary authority to regulate tariff 
administration, this general authority for the Commissioner to 
regulate internal taxes was hedged only by the qualification that the 
power be performed “under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.”143 
In addition to the general grant of regulatory authority, which 
was carried over from revenue act to revenue act, the early internal 
revenue acts contained a multiplicity of specific grants of authority. 
By my count, there were at least forty-three separate additional grants 
of authority to perform specific regulatory actions in the Revenue Act 
of 1864, twenty of which gave authority solely to the Commissioner, 
fourteen of which gave authority solely to the Secretary, and nine of 
which gave authority to the Commissioner but required approval by 
the Secretary.144 
 
173, § 174, 13 Stat. 223, 304. A subsequent section authorized the Secretary, in turn, to make 
regulations to collect any tax imposed by statute where “the mode or time of assessment or 
collection is not therein provided.” Id. § 176, 13 Stat. at 305.  
 143. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432, 432–33 
 144. The provisions granting authority solely to the Commissioner included: Act of June 30, 
1864 § 8, 13 Stat. at 224 (rules for dividing assessment districts); id. § 29, 13 Stat. at 234 (rules for 
sale of seized property); id. § 59, 13 Stat. at 244 (rules for marking the quantity and proof of 
liquor); id. § 61, 13 Stat. at 245 (rules for accounting for leakages during transportation of 
liquor); id. § 82, 13 Stat. at 258 (rules for the form and detail of declarations of sales or deliveries 
by certain manufacturers); id. § 84, 13 Stat. at 259 (rules for sale of seized goods); id. § 94, 13 
Stat. at 265 (broad discretion to write rules applying the statutes written for distillers of spirits to 
distillers of, among other things, coal-oil and naphtha); id. § 94, 13 Stat. at 269 (rules for returns, 
assessment, and collection of duties on wines not made from grapes, currents, rhubarb, or 
berries); id. § 102, 13 Stat. at 275 (rules for determining the number of slaughtered livestock 
subject to tax); id. § 109, 13 Stat. at 277 (rules for the form and manner of reporting returns 
made by certain businesses); id. § 110, 13 Stat. at 278 (rules for the form and manner of 
reporting returns made by banks); id. § 118, 13 Stat. at 282 (rules for the form and manner of 
claiming an exemption from the duty to provide a return); id. § 118, 13 Stat. at 283 (rules for 
form and manner for taxpayers to administratively appeal decisions of assistant assessors); id. 
§ 122, 13 Stat. at 285 (rules for form and manner of income returns made by certain businesses); 
id. § 125, 13 Stat. at 286 (rules for form and manner of estate tax returns made by executors); id. 
§ 143, 13 Stat. at 290 (very broad discretion to mash up the various classes of estate taxes “as he 
shall think fit,” discharge all successors when the mashed-up tax so determined, and extend time 
for payment “in special cases in which he may think it expedient so to do”); id. § 157, 13 Stat. at 
293 (broad discretion to create rules for cancelling stamps “as substitute for, or in addition to, 
the method now prescribed by law, as he may deem expedient and effectual”); id. § 161, 13 Stat. 
at 294–95 (rules for the allowance of spoiled stamps); id. § 162, 13 Stat. at 295 (rules governing 
how taxpayers may obtain guidance on whether or not a particular instrument is subject to any 
stamp duty); id. § 170, 13 Stat. at 298 (rules for issuance and distribution of stamps prepayment). 
 The provisions giving authority solely to the Secretary included: id. § 2, 13 Stat. at 223 
(rules governing the Commissioner’s keeping and paying of accounts); id. § 3, 13 Stat. at 224 
(rules prescribing Commissioner’s duties); id. § 9, 13 Stat. at 225 (rules governing the collectors' 
keeping of accounts and paying taxes collected); id. § 44, 13 Stat. at 239–40 (rules regulating the 
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The unprecedented scope of the new taxing statutes created an 
unprecedented demand for guidance, and Boutwell was up for the 
challenge. By his estimate, his office pumped out up to eight hundred 
letters per day.145 His productivity came from his organizational skills: 
Boutwell reported that he divided his personnel into subject-matter 
areas and, as did Treasury, answered common questions with form 
letters.146 
The combination of statutory authority granted to the 
Commissioner and Boutwell’s disciplined responses thus created a 
new level of guidance, unmediated by his boss, the Secretary. This 
Commissioner-level guidance made its first public appearance in 
Boutwell’s Manual of the Direct and Excise Tax System of the United 
States, a remarkable compilation of tax guidance that Boutwell 
published in April 1863, just after his short, eight-month stay in office. 
The purpose of the compilation was “to furnish to the officers of the 
revenue, to business men, and to members of the legal profession, 
such authority and information for the transaction of business, as can 
be derived from the proceedings, experience, and decisions of the 
 
power of the Commissioner to return erroneously assessed collected funds); id. § 56, 13 Stat. at 
243 (rules for the inspection and gauging of spirits); id. § 61, 13 Stat. at 245 (rules for obtaining 
exception to excise tax by using bonded warehouses); id. § 90, 13 Stat. at 263 (rules for 
transporting manufactured tobacco, snuff, or cigars to bonded warehouses); id. § 94, 13 Stat. at 
265 (broad discretion to write rules applying the statutes written for assessment and collection 
of duties on cotton to turpentine); id. § 97, 13 Stat. at 273 (rules on what qualifies as a federal 
government purchase contract entered into before the effective date of the statute that would be 
eligible for tax exemption); id. § 168, 13 Stat. at 296 (rules governing the manufacturing of 
certain articles intended for export); id. § 170, 13 Stat. at 297–98 (rules governing distribution 
and supply of materials to make stamps); id. § 171, 13 Stat. at 303 (general rules for how 
taxpayers may use certificates of drawback in lieu of payment); id. § 176 13 Stat. at 305 (rules for 
mode or time of assessment or collection of any tax if the mode or time of assessment is not in 
the statute); id. § 177, 13 Stat. at 305 (rules for taxpayers to show previous payments of tax on 
cotton). 
 The provisions giving authority to the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary 
included: id. § 6, 13 Stat. at 224 (rules for the duties of subordinates); id. § 9, 13 Stat. at 225 
(rules setting the amount of bonds which collectors were required to provide before assuming 
office); id. § 11, 13 Stat. at 225 (rules for form of returns); id. § 33, 13 Stat. at 236 (rules for how 
collectors were to make their deposits); id. § 46, 13 Stat. at 240 (rules for time and manner of 
collection of taxes in re-conquered territories); id. § 84, 13 Stat. at 259 (rules for sale of forfeited 
manufactured goods); id. § 117, 13 Stat. at 281–82 (rules for how to include and report certain 
income earned by U.S. government employees); id. § 119, 13 Stat. at 283 (rules for form and 
manner of warrants issued to seize property); id. § 171, 13 Stat. at 303 (rules for how taxpayers 
may use certificates of drawbacks in lieu of payments of duties on cotton). 
 145. BOUTWELL, supra note 129, at v. 
 146. Id.  
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Office of Internal Revenue.”147 After setting out the statutes then in 
force, Boutwell then compiled all of the tax guidance issued to date, 
including the then-familiar Treasury circulars, some Treasury 
documents titled “regulations,” and some of Boutwell’s letters to 
collectors and taxpayers, which he denominated “rulings.”148 
It is the set of rulings from Boutwell that are most remarkable. 
They were different from any kind of guidance that had come before. 
First, they were issued at a level of authority that was lower than the 
President or Secretary.149 Second, the rulings were summaries of 
various letters and, in some cases, the rulings simply used the exact 
language used in the letters.150 In other cases, however, the rulings 
modified or reversed the original letters to reflect the experience of 
the office.151 As a consequence of these three features, Boutwell 
cautioned that “the Rulings should not be regarded as binding upon 
the Office of Internal Revenue, but rather as the opinions of the 
editor of this volume.”152 This distinction between rules created by the 
Commissioner and rules created by the Secretary has remained, and 
similar language can still be found in the preface to every Internal 
Revenue Bulletin today.153 
 
 147. Id.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 104, at 33, 35 (noting Boutwell’s 
installation as Commissioner on July 17, 1862, and his resignation on March 4, 1863). Boutwell 
published a follow-up volume in 1866 to codify the many changes Congress made in the tax 
statutes in 1865 and 1866. See GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, Preface to THE TAX-PAYER’S MANUAL 
(Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1866). 
 148. See generally BOUTWELL, supra note 129. The other contemporary compilations set out 
some of the same documents but give them different names. What Boutwell called “Rulings,” 
Charles Estee called “Decisions of the Commissioner” or sometimes “Regulations of the 
Commissioner.” See, e.g., ESTEE, supra note 129, at 214, 270. By the time Estee printed his 
compilation, the various instructions to field agents had been retitled as “Regulations” and had 
numbers associated with them. See, e.g., id. at 270. In addition to those of Boutwell and Estee, 
other private publications soon followed, many of which not only reproduced the statutes in 
force, but also reprinted much of the guidance issued by the Commissioner. E.g., EMERSON, 
supra note 129.  
 149. See BOUTWELL, supra note 129, at 300. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Here is the statement used in the very first Cumulative Bulletin issued in December 
1919:  
The Income Tax Rulings constitute a service of information from which taxpayers 
and their counsel may obtain the best available indication of the trend and tendency 
of official opinion in the administration of the income . . . provisions of the Revenue 
Acts. The rulings have none of the force or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not 
commit the Department to any interpretation of law which has not been formally 
approved and promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
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These changes in the concept of administrative regulation, which 
were created by the Civil War tax statutes, played out in both of the 
problems addressed by this Article: the problem of authority and the 
problem of issuance. I will consider each in turn. 
A. The Problem of Authority 
The case law that developed between the Civil War and the 
enactment of the APA in 1946 did not draw a clear distinction 
between the authority of tax guidance issued by the Secretary and this 
new sub–Treasury guidance issued by the Commissioner without 
approval by the Secretary. This subsection gives two examples of 
ways in which courts addressed the issue of authority. First is a class 
of civil cases involving distilleries. These cases draw a sharp 
distinction between the legal effect of rules issued by the 
Commissioner and rules issued by the Secretary. The second example 
is a class of criminal cases that involve the oleomargarine tax. In these 
cases, the level of approval was less important than the specificity of 
the grant of regulatory authority. This subsection concludes by 
discussing authority problems caused by statutory change. 
In a series of cases in the 1890s involving distilleries, courts 
distinguished between Treasury guidance and sub–Treasury 
guidance.154 During this period, Congress taxed the production of 
alcohol,155 regardless of whether it was legal or illegal in any particular 
state.156 In state prosecutions against illegal distilleries, state courts 
demanded that collectors or their deputies turn over federal tax 
records of the alleged illegal distilleries.157 When federal employees 
refused, the employees were thrown in jail and had to file habeas 
writs to be released.158 Just as the collector of customs in Tracy v. 
Swartwout used Treasury instructions as a liability shield,159 so did the 
 
1 C.B. i (1919). That language now reads: “Rulings and procedures reported in the Bulletin do 
not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations, but they may be used as 
precedents.” Introduction, 2014-11 I.R.B. 623.  
 154. See infra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.  
 155. E.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 55, 13 Stat. 223, 243. 
 156. The plain language of the taxing acts did not condition the tax on the legality of the 
distilleries, thereby prompting this set of disputes. See generally In re Hirsch, 74 F. 928, 928 
(C.C.D. Conn. 1896). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 929.  
 159. See Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 88 (1836); see supra notes 96–101 and 
accompanying text. 
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federal employees try to use instructions from their superiors as their 
get-out-of-jail card.160 
The effectiveness of this “just following orders” defense turned 
on the difference between Treasury guidance and sub–Treasury 
guidance. In the early 1890s, only rulings and circulars from the 
Commissioner instructed employees to withhold tax records from 
state courts. That was not good enough for the courts to grant the 
habeas writs. In In re Hirsch,161 the court conceded that “[r]egulations 
made by the head of one of the departments of the government, in 
pursuance of a statute authorizing them to be made, have the force of 
law over those to be affected thereby.”162 The problem was that the 
court could find no such regulations.163 Instead, it could only find 
rulings of the Commissioner which it concluded were “not the 
regulations in regard to the assessment of the internal revenue which 
have the force of a statute.”164 The court viewed these rulings as 
“instructions based upon the commissioner’s legal opinion.”165  
After In re Hirsch, Treasury incorporated the same instructions 
into Regulations, Series 7, No. 12.166 After that, lower courts had no 
difficulty granting habeas writs.167 Neither did the Supreme Court. In 
Boske v. Comingore,168 Justice Harlan employed the following logic: 
First, Congress had the power to make all laws “necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the powers vested by [the Constitution] in 
the Government of the United States or in any Department or officer 
 
 160. In re Hirsch, 74 F. at 930–32. 
 161. In re Hirsch, 74 F. 928 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896). 
 162. Id. at 931. But see In re Huttman, 70 F. 699, 701–02 (D. Kan. 1895) (“[T]he 
commissioner of internal revenue, with the approval of the secretary of the treasury, by statute 
is given the power to make such regulations as he deems necessary in the matter of the 
assessment and collection of internal revenue. . . . [S]uch regulations have the force of 
statutes.”).   
 163. In re Hirsch, 74 F. at 931. 
 164. See id. at 932 (“This letter and others of like character . . . are not the regulations in 
regard to the assessment of the internal revenue which have the force of a statute. They express 
the views of an officer of the government . . . .”). 
 165. Id. A minority of courts disagreed with this analysis, with one court concluding that the 
ruling “must be regarded by all as having the same force as an act of congress.” In re Huttman, 
70 F. at 701. 
 166. T.D. 19,245, in 1 TREASURY DECISIONS UNDER TARIFF AND INTERNAL REVENUE 
LAWS ETC. (D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1898). The amendments are reprinted in In re 
Comingore, 96 F. 552, 559 (D. Ky. 1899), aff’d sub nom. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 
(1900).  
 167. See, e.g., In re Weeks, 82 F. 729, 731–32 (D. Vt. 1897). Perhaps this is the first example 
of what Professor Lederman calls “fighting regs.” See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.  
 168. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1890). 
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thereof.”169 Second, that power “was exerted by Congress when it 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to [write] regulations not 
inconsistent with law.”170 Third, the regulations at issue were not 
“inconsistent with law.”171 Justice Harlan emphasized that the 
Secretary could not go “beyond the authority conferred upon him by 
Congress,” and the evaluation of that issue was the same as the 
evaluation “[that] controls when an act of Congress is assailed as not 
being within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution.”172 In 
other words, all regulations properly enacted should receive 
heightened deference. In Harlan’s opinion, there was neither a 
distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations, nor a 
distinction between specific and general regulatory authority.173 
Instead, Justice Harlan focused on the level of authority. 
Second, and in contrast to the distillery cases, are criminal cases 
in which the government prosecuted taxpayers for violating the tax 
laws on oleomargarine. In these cases, the difference between success 
and failure of the regulatory effort was not the level of regulatory 
authority; rather it was the specificity of the regulatory authority. 
On August 2, 1886, Congress passed a statute imposing an excise 
tax on the manufacture of oleomargarine.174 Section 6 of the statute 
placed a duty on manufacturers to properly label their packages of 
oleomargarine in a manner “as the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
prescribe” and provided criminal penalties for violation of the duty.175 
This duty was typical language in internal revenue statutes that 
imposed excise taxes.176 Other sections of the statute created other 
duties and imposed criminal consequences for their violation,177 with 
 
 169. Id. at 469 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 468–70. 
 172. Id. at 470. 
 173. See generally id. 
 174. Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209. The statute was widely understood to 
be a protectionist measure in favor of butter producers. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public 
Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. 
REV. 83, 126–29 (1989). 
 175. Oleomargarine Act of 1886 § 6, 24 Stat. at 210. 
 176. Cf., e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 59, 13 Stat. 223, 244 (requiring distillers to 
“mark upon the cask or other package containing such spirits, in a manner to be prescribed by 
said commissioner, the quantity and proof of the contents of such cask”). 
 177. See, e.g., Oleomargarine Act of 1886 § 7, 24 Stat. at 210 (providing for a fine of $50 for 
removing labels); id. § 15, 24 Stat. at 212 (providing for a fine of $100–$2,000 and a prison 
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section 18 being a catchall provision that imposed a $1,000 penalty on 
any taxpayer who failed to do “any of the things required by law in 
the carrying on or conducting of . . . business.”178 In addition, section 
20 gave general authority to the Commissioner, with approval by the 
Secretary, to “make all needful regulations for the carrying into effect 
of this act.”179 
Although the specific grant of authority to regulate in section 6 
and the general grant of authority to regulate in section 20 both 
required the same level of approval—that of the Secretary—it was the 
difference in specificity and not the level of approval that determined 
the success or failure of the government to prosecute a taxpayer for 
violations of regulations under the act. This difference in specificity is 
illustrated in the lower courts’ responses to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Eaton.180 In Eaton, the taxpayer was 
indicted for violating section 18 by failing to keep certain records 
required by Treasury Regulations.181 The regulations were issued 
under the general authority of section 20.182 In response to a certified 
question, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “required by law” 
in section 18 did not include Treasury Regulations.183 The Court 
reasoned that, although a regulation imposing a duty not contained in 
the statute may well have the “force of law” for some purposes, “it 
does not follow that a thing required by them is a thing so required by 
law as to make the neglect to do the thing a criminal offence.”184 
Despite the result in Eaton, prosecutions of taxpayers for 
violating marking regulations under section 6 succeeded. About one 
week after Eaton was decided, a district court upheld an indictment 
for violating regulations promulgated pursuant to section 6. In United 
States v. Ford,185 the taxpayer was indicted for violating section 6 
because he failed to mark containers of oleomargarine as required by 
Treasury Regulations.186 The court distinguished Eaton by evaluating 
 
sentence for removing revenue stamps); id. § 17, 24 Stat. at 212 (providing for, among other 
things, a $500–$5,000 fine and a prison sentence for evading the tax). 
 178. Id. § 18, 24 Stat. at 212. 
 179. Id. § 20, 24 Stat. at 212. 
 180. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892). 
 181. Id. at 678–79.  
 182. Id. at 686. 
 183. Id. at 688.  
 184. Id. 
 185. United States v. Ford, 50 F. 467 (E.D. Mo. 1892). 
 186. Id. at 467–68. 
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the relationship between the marking regulations and the alleged 
statutory violation: 
The difficulty in the Eaton Case was that congress had not created 
any such offense as that for which the defendant was indicted. The 
commissioner had in fact assumed to amend the law. But in the case 
at bar there is no such difficulty. The offense charged in the 
indictment is one fully described in the sixth section of the act. The 
marks and brands prescribed by the commissioner are such as he 
was specially authorized to prescribe. In the case at bar, therefore, 
the indictment states an offense against the laws of the United 
States, unless the decision in U.S. v. Eaton is understood to mean 
that no regulation of the commissioner of internal revenue can have 
the force and effect of law.187 
Later courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently followed this 
rationale in upholding other indictments for violations of section 6.188 
So here we have a tax regulation issued under a specific statute 
that was sufficiently authoritative to support a criminal indictment. 
But the reason was not because the regulation did anything novel. 
The regulation did not impermissibly enlarge or modify or add to the 
statute. It interpreted the statute; the courts consistently describe the 
marking regulation as “a matter of executive detail in the 
enforcement of this revenue act, rather than of legislative action.”189 
Filling in these details fell within the traditional interpretative 
function of administrative rules and so “involved no unconstitutional 
delegation of power.”190 
Another thorny authority problem for tax guidance of all kinds—
especially after Congress reinstated the income tax in 1913—was the 
relationship between tax rules and statutory changes.191 Each new 
 
 187. Id. at 468–69. 
 188. See In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1897); Wilkins v. United States, 96 F. 837, 839–40 
(3d Cir. 1899); Prather v. United States, 9 App. D.C. 82, 88–90 (D.C. Cir. 1896). 
 189. Wilkins, 96 F. at 839; see also In re Kollock, 165 U.S. at 533 (noting that the regulation 
was a “mere matter of detail”).  
 190. In re Kollock, 165 U.S. at 537. Thus, here, I respectfully part company with Professors 
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts, who believe that “[b]y specifically providing for the 
imposition of sanctions for the violation of a given regulation, Congress resolved any question 
of authority and also sent an unambiguous signal of its intent that the resulting rules have the 
force of law.” Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of 
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 499 (2002). 
 191. See Carlton Fox, Preface to 127 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 1, 3–6 
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revenue act had to be correlated with prior law, yet the acts 
themselves were inconsistent: some repealed all provisions of prior 
acts and substituted new ones, others repealed only parts of prior 
acts, and still others had no clear directions either way.192 In response 
to this problem, an office in the BIR prepared new regulations, 
sometimes with new numbers and sometimes with the same number, 
for each new revenue act.193 For example, Regulations 33 were 
published to guide taxpayers and BIR personnel on the subject of 
income taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1913.194 But there was a 
separate Regulations 33 for the Revenue Act of 1916.195 To cover the 
period between the new revenue act’s effective date and the new 
regulations, the “decision” of the Secretary was that “income-tax 
regulations in force . . . are hereby extended and made applicable to 
the act of September 8, 1916, so far as not inconsistent with the 
provisions of that statute.”196 
An additional question raised by the frequent statutory changes 
in tax laws was what authority regulations continued to have once the 
laws had changed, even when part of the particular subject of 
guidance had been cut and pasted from one statute into the next. This 
problem was exacerbated by the difficulties in creating a meaningful 
federal codification of the laws. The Revised Statutes of the 1870s had 
proved a failure, and efforts to recodify all federal statutes did not 
gain traction until well after World War I, with the U.S. Code first 
entering into force in 1925.197 It is not surprising, then, that the 
 
(Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) (explaining, in brief, the evolution of tax regulations from 
1863 to 1936).  
 192. Generally, up until the revenue laws were once again consolidated into the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939, each revenue law contained an extension provision like section 1100 of 
the Revenue Act of 1926: “All administrative, special, or stamp provisions of law, including the 
law relating to the assessment of taxes, so far as applicable, are hereby extended to and made a 
part of this Act.” Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1100, 44 Stat. 9, 111. 
 193. 1 ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MONOGRAPH NO. 22, ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS: BUREAU OF 
INTERNAL REVENUE, BOARD OF TAX APPEALS, PROCESSING TAX BOARD OF REVIEW 144 
(1940).  
 194. Regulations 33, T.D. 1944, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 27 (1914). 
 195. Regulations 33 (rev.), T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 126 (1918).  
 196. T.D. 2367, 18 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 168, 168 (1916). 
 197. See Roy G. Fitzgerald, 1 U.S.C. preface (1926). For a more detailed history of this 
process, and for an example of the complexity this created with respect to just one issue of tax 
administration, see Camp, Tax Administration, supra note 134, at 36–51. 
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authority of Treasury Regulations was sometimes overtaken by 
statutory events, and yet no one would notice for decades.198 
B. The Problem of Issuance 
Perhaps the most important consequence arising from the 
volume and complexity of administrative guidance issued as a result 
of the Civil War tax statutes was the need to convey guidance to both 
internal and external stakeholders. The new tax statutes imposed a 
new set of duties on citizens and, as today, required an understanding 
of those duties and cooperation in making the proper reports and 
paying the proper tax. Commissioner Boutwell and later 
Commissioners thus found themselves responding to questions from 
taxpayers as well as collectors and assessors.199 Thus arose the 
problem of how to issue guidance in a timely and transparent manner.  
Though the various collectors received guidance in the forms of 
circulars, serials, and Treasury Decisions, I have not discovered any 
official mechanism for distribution of the same guidance to the public 
at large before the 1890s. Rather, private publications collected both 
statutes and administrative rulings together and were published for 
both “subordinate revenue officers and the public.”200 
After the Civil War, Treasury began issuing weekly editions of its 
Treasury Decisions, and in 1899 began publishing yearly volumes that 
cumulated the weekly editions.201 It appears that every type of 
guidance issued was labeled as a Treasury Decision, whether it was 
what we would now distinguish as a regulation, a revenue ruling, a 
 
 198. See Camp, Tax Administration, supra note 134, at 48, 50 n.253 (recounting the story of 
Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688, 689–90 (2d Cir. 1934), in which the enforcement of a summons 
was denied when a Treasury Regulation was based on a codified statute that had lapsed).  
 199. Typical of these is Commissioner N.B. Scott’s response to a letter from one taxpayer, a 
Frank H. Platt, disputing the Commissioner’s interpretation of the revenue laws and suggesting 
“that the matter be immediately submitted by you to the United States attorney, with a view to 
having the question submitted to the United States court on an agreed statement of facts.” T.D. 
20,459, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 7 (1898). To this Scott replied: “[T]he internal-revenue tax is not 
collected through the courts . . . . The courts can be appealed to after the Commissioner’s 
decisions have been complied with, and not before.” Id. at 7–8. 
 200. EMERSON, supra note 129, at iii; see also ESTEE, supra note 129, at iii (“The compiler 
has endeavored to prepare a volume valuable to every officer of the law, also to every lawyer, 
merchant, manufacturer, and tax payer . . . .”).  
 201. The decision to publish the first cumulative volume, which contained “decisions extant 
December 31, 1898,” was made in response to “the great demand . . . upon the Department for 
copies of these [weekly] decisions.” 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 5, 5 (1899). The first cumulative 
volume was so popular that a second was published the following year. See 2 Treas. Dec. Int. 
Rev. 5, 5 (1900). 
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private letter ruling, or just a report of a court case important to tax 
administration. Moreover, every type of guidance issued was labeled 
as a Treasury Decision irrespective of whether it was issued by the 
Commissioner alone or the Commissioner acting with approval from 
the Secretary.202  
Beginning in 1919, the government gave income-tax guidance its 
own publication, published in a weekly Bulletin and compiled into 
twice-yearly Cumulative Bulletins.203 The nomenclature also changed. 
Tax guidance issued at the Treasury level was still labeled a Treasury 
Decision and was still published in the yearly volumes of Treasury 
Decisions, but sub–Treasury guidance documents were no longer 
labeled Treasury Decisions nor published in those yearly volumes. 
Instead, both Treasury Decisions and all sub–Treasury guidance were 
published in the Cumulative Bulletins, including rulings signed by the 
Commissioner as well as lower-level guidance, such as legal opinions, 
committee recommendations, and office (as opposed to Treasury) 
decisions.204 This arrangement sometimes led to a Treasury Decision 
being published in two places.205 
The frequency of statutory change also created problems for the 
issuance of tax guidance. As regulations outlived their implementing 
statute, they were revised into different regulations with different 
numbers and were thus difficult to track.206 To fill the need for 
correlating guidance with the appropriate statutes, private companies 
 
 202. See, e.g., T.D. 21,875, 2 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 315 (1899) (letter “[t]o collectors of 
internal revenue and others” containing a list of drugs, the revenue from which was exempt 
from tax, signed by the Commissioner and the Secretary); T.D. 21,814, 2 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 
314 (1899) (letter “[t]o collectors of internal revenue and others” amending a regulation, signed 
by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary); T.D. 20,952, 2 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 95 
(1899) (letter “[t]o collectors and other officers of internal revenue” circulating a federal court 
decision, signed by the Commissioner alone); T.D. 20,365, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 27 (1898) 
(letter to a firm ruling on whether proposed transactions were subject to bankers’ special-tax 
liability, signed by the Commissioner alone); T.D. 19,739, 1 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 9 (1898) (letter 
interpreting a provision of the war-revenue act as applied to cattle sales, signed by the 
Commissioner alone). 
 203. 1 C.B. iii, iii, intro. (1919). 
 204. See, e.g., 3 C.B. 3, 3, preface (1920) (listing the various types of guidance documents 
published in that edition). 
 205. For example, Treasury Decision 3037 was published in the Cumulative Bulletin, T.D. 
3037, 3 C.B. 93 (1920), and with the yearly compilation of Treasury Decisions, T.D. 3037, 22 
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 311 (1920). This duplication ceased in 1942 when, to conserve paper, 
Treasury discontinued publishing the compilation of Treasury Decisions. See 36 Treas. Dec. Int. 
Rev. iii, iii (1942). 
 206. For one example of the difficultly in tracing regulations from 1918 through 1926, see 
generally Appeal of Blum’s, Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737 (1927). 
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created services that published multivolume serial sets.207 Treasury 
also published periodic compilations of the internal revenue laws in 
force as of a specific year, which contained heavily annotated 
reproductions of the relevant statutes and attempted to relate the 
various statutes to the relevant versions of the I.R.C.208 
C. The Impact of Regulatory Changes 
These problems of issuance and authority led to three important 
developments in tax administration in the period leading up to the 
APA’s enactment: (1) the reenactment doctrine, (2) the retroactivity 
doctrine, and (3) the emergence of the idea of legislative and 
interpretative regulations. 
First, the reenactment doctrine was the judicial work-around to 
the problem of regulations being overtaken by statutory changes.209 
The doctrine was built on the idea that reenactment of statutory 
provisions with unchanged, previously used statutory language, 
represented an implicit approval of the prior administrative 
construction of that language.210 Drawing from hints and suggestions 
in late-nineteenth-century cases, the Supreme Court fully embraced 
this idea by the late 1930s,211 and it became the subject of robust 
scholarly debate.212  The debate became particularly academic after 
the creation of an amendable I.R.C. in 1939, because Congress no 
longer had to reenact the entire body of tax statutes every time it 
wanted to change some aspect of federal taxation.213 This 
 
 207. See, e.g., [1947] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) iii (explaining that the Standard Federal 
Tax Reporter “stems from the first loose leaf tax Reporter which was published in 1913 for the 
express purpose of providing complete coverage of the first constitutional income tax law and 
the developments under it”); cf. 4 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 405 (1926) (advertising special 
cabinets designed to hold Tax Services). 
 208. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, DOCUMENT NO. 
2981, INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS IN FORCE APRIL 1, 1927 (1928). 
 209. For a summary of the history of the reenactment doctrine, see generally Norman J. 
Hearn, Comment, Taxation: Effect of Re-Enactment of Revenue Statutes After Administrative 
Interpretation, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 578 (1939). 
 210. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 400. 
 211. E.g., Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939) 
 212. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 398 n.1 (listing just some of the articles contributing to 
the debate). 
 213. Statutes before 1939 reenacted the entire set of tax provisions. See generally Revenue 
Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648. Statutes after 1939 amended the Tax Code. See Revenue Act 
of 1940, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 862; see also Feller, supra note 42, at 1314 (noting that “we may have 
seen an end” to the periodic reenactment of the basic taxing statute).  
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development in tax administrative law spread into other substantive 
areas as well.214  
Second, the retroactivity doctrine was built on the idea that 
Treasury Decisions interpreting the taxing statutes were “merely 
declaring what the statute had meant all along, and therefore [were] 
necessarily retroactive.”215 After all, as seen in Justice Harlan’s 1900 
Boske opinion, Treasury Decisions were only as good as the authority 
given by Congress to issue them.216 And the general authority to make 
all “needful regulations” was a license neither to add substance to a 
statute nor to interpret what was not there to be interpreted.217 But 
insofar as Treasury Regulations were a proper exercise of authority, 
this same theory that limited the rulemaking power in one respect 
gave it enormous power in another respect: the regulations were 
automatically retroactive and Treasury was powerless to do anything 
about that.218 The harshness of this rule was felt most when Treasury 
changed its regulations; the new regulation would then supersede the 
old, not just on a going-forward basis but also for all cases. 
Accordingly, and at Treasury’s request, Congress added a  
provision to the Revenue Act of 1921219  that gave Treasury the power 
to change regulations and Treasury Decisions without retroactive 
effect in what is now codified as I.R.C. § 7805(b).220 The presumption 
 
 214. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 42, at 1314 (“[T]here is still some question outside the tax 
field as to whether reenactment should be considered an aid in determining the weight to be 
given administrative constructions.”).  
 215. Wis. Nipple & Fabricating Corp. v. Comm’r, 581 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 216. See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900). 
 217. Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1924). There, the statute imposed a 
tax on “adulterated butter,” defining that as butter that contained “abnormal” amounts of 
moisture. Id. at 319. Treasury Regulation No. 9, in turn, defined “abnormal” as any moisture 
content greater than 16 percent. Id. The Court held that “[t]he regulation prescribes a standard 
which Congress has not authorized the Commissioner or the Secretary to fix. It sets up a 
definition of adulterated butter which conflicts with that contained in the act.” Id. at 321. 
 218. See Paul Gordon Hoffman, Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the 
Internal Revenue Service: Redefining Abuse of Discretion Under 7805(b), 23 UCLA L. REV. 529, 
532 (1976) (noting that, prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1314, 42 
Stat. 227, 314, the judicial position was that “[a]n incorrect [Treasury] interpretation [of a 
statute] . . . did not alter the law’s meaning; only Congress could modify the law it had made,” 
and “[s]ince an incorrect interpretation was therefore a nullity, a correct interpretation 
necessarily operated retroactively to the date of adoption of the legislation”). 
 219.  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. 
 220.  Id. § 1314, 42 Stat. at 314 (current version at I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012)). The path from 
the 1921 language to the current language in § 7805(b) goes something like this: The original 
statute gave the discretion to not make regulations retroactive. Id. That discretion was extended 
in 1928 to cover new regulations, Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 605, 45 Stat. 791, 874, and in 
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of retroactivity remained, however, because Treasury Regulations 
were simply declarative, or interpretive, of the law. If Treasury did 
not exercise its discretion to make its Treasury Decisions operate 
prospectively, taxpayers bore a heavy burden to convince a court that 
Treasury had abused its discretion.221  
The 1921 discretion to make regulations prospective was given to 
all three classes of regulatory guidance discussed above:222 it extended 
the discretion to any “regulation or Treasury decision relating to the 
internal revenue laws made by the Commissioner or the Secretary, or 
by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.”223 By 
making no reference to any difference in the legal effect of 
regulations issued pursuant to a specific grant of authority and those 
issued pursuant to a general grant of authority, this statutory 
language suggests that all regulations were interpretative; otherwise 
there would be no need to permit their prospective application. 
Third, there emerged the idea that tax regulations could be a 
legitimate exercise of legislative authority.224 As of 1920, all legitimate 
tax regulations were viewed as interpretative of the tax laws. 
Regulations that went beyond interpretations were invalid exercises 
of power precisely because they were legislative in character. The 
tariff cases, distillery cases, and oleomargarine cases are all consistent 
 
1934 to cover the Commissioner’s rulings as well, Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 506, 48 Stat. 
680, 757. The 1934 modification also eliminated the prior all-or-nothing approach by authorizing 
flexibility to determine “the extent, if any” to which regulations could not be retroactively 
applied. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 38 (1934) (noting the possibility for 
“inequitable results” from retrospective application and thus the “desirab[ility]” of giving 
Treasury “the power to avoid these results”).   
 221. See Bryan T. Camp, Note, The Retroactivity of Treasury Regulations: Paths to Finding 
Abuse of Discretion, 7 VA. TAX REV. 509, 510–11 (1987). In 1996, Congress flipped the 
presumption to be one of prospective application only. At the same time, Congress authorized 
Treasury to issue regulations with retroactive effect from the date of the first public proposal or 
—if “filed or issued” within eighteen months of a statutory change or to “prevent abuse”—from 
the date of the statutory change. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(a), 110 
Stat. 1452, 1468–69 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012)).  
 222. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 223. Revenue Act of 1921 § 1314, 42 Stat. at 314 (emphases added). 
 224. My claim is not that this time period is when Congress started giving specific 
rulemaking grants as well as general ones. As I discuss above at note 144, the provisions of the 
Revenue Act of 1864 demonstrate the contrary. The extent to which Congress made specific 
rulemaking delegations before 1913 has been somewhat underappreciated. Cf., e.g., Kristin E. 
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1537, 1565 (2006) (“The Revenue Act of 1916 introduced a few specific rulemaking grants. 
Subsequent tax statutes included those and added more.” (footnote omitted)). Until I did this 
study, I would have agreed completely with Professor Hickman’s characterization. 
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with the view that tax regulations could not change, enlarge, or 
modify the substance of the law to be obeyed by taxpayers, even if 
regulations could legitimately control government employees.225  
Thus, my claim here is not that there was no distinction between 
legislative and interpretative regulations before the APA. It is rather 
that the only legitimate tax regulations were those that interpreted the 
tax statutes. 
More evidence that Treasury Regulations were viewed as 
functioning solely to interpret the statutes comes from the legal 
history of what is now I.R.C. § 7805(a), which grants general 
authority for the “Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary,” 
to issue all “needful rules and regulations.”226 Recall that the Civil 
War statutes had contained not only similar general authority but also 
multiple specific-authority provisions.227 This pattern continued after 
the revival of the income tax in 1913, and by 1921 some legislators 
were troubled by it. In the debate over the Revenue Act of 1921, for 
example, Senator David Walsh complained that “[i]n more than 20 
places in the bill the commissioner is given flexible authority for the 
first time. That is a great departure from previous tax legislation.”228 
Eventually, however, Walsh explained his agreement to the various 
specific grants of authority: 
I wish to say . . . the language of this bill is so involved and the 
meaning in many places is so obscure and almost nonunderstandable 
that somebody ought to have discretion in administering its 
provisions. . . . Under such circumstances there ought to be 
[e]ntrusted to some authority the power to interpret them and to 
exercise some discretion.229 
Walsh’s statement provides support for the proposition that the 
specific delegations were no different in kind than the general ones: 
they were interpretative. 
By 1924, some congressmen were concerned enough about 
Treasury’s discretion that they reintroduced the idea Congress used 
in the Tariff Act of 1832, that the general rulemaking authority could 
only be exercised if it was “not inconsistent with the laws of the 
 
 225. See supra Part III.A.  
 226. I.R.C. § 7805(a).  
 227. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 228. 61 CONG. REC. 6559, 6576 (1921) (statement of Sen. Walsh).   
 229. Id. 
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United States.”230 The House bill proposed to put a similar qualifier in 
the Revenue Act of 1924 so that the Commissioner had, with the 
approval of the Secretary, the power to issue rules and regulations for 
enforcement of that Act, but only if the rules did “not enlarge or 
modify any provisions of this act and of any other law.”231 The 
Conference Report accepted the Senate’s strike of that language.232 
Senator Reed Smoot explained that “[t]he words stricken out were 
omitted as surplusage. There is no necessity for the provision,” 
because “[n]o regulation of any department can set aside the law.”233 
The first discussion of a new idea (new, at least, as to tax 
administration) that regulations could be both legislative and 
legitimate appears in J. Hardy Patten’s extensive 1926 treatment of 
the legal authority of Treasury Regulations, in which he strung 
together several Supreme Court decisions to claim that “[a]s long as 
Congress, in delegating legislative power to an executive or 
administrative agency, finds an adequate necessity for the delegation 
and prescribes a ‘standard’ or ‘rules of decision,’ it is not 
unconstitutional as a pure ‘delegation of legislative power.’”234 
Accepting the idea that there could indeed be legitimate legislative 
regulations, Patten nonetheless concluded that the majority of the 
regulations administering the income tax were interpretative.235 
The first example of legitimate legislative regulations in tax 
administration I can find came in 1928, when Congress explicitly gave 
the Secretary the authority to make a substantive decision about 
whom to tax. For years the question of how to tax a group of 
 
 230. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, § 9, 4 Stat. 583, 592; see supra note 80 and accompanying 
text. 
 231. H.R. REP. NO. 68-844, at 31 (1924) (Conf. Rep.). 
 232. Id. 
 233. 65 CONG. REC. 7140 (1924) (statement of Sen. Reed Smoot). The qualifying language 
was not in the final provision. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1001, 43 Stat. 253, 339. 
 234. Patten, supra note 39, at 473. Patten cites Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904), 
and Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). The latter case may be what caused concern to those 
who, in 1924, sought to put the “not inconsistent with the laws” qualifier back into the general 
authority statute. Cf. 65 CONG. REC. 3333 (1924) (statement of Rep. Joseph Deal) (“The 
Supreme Court has rendered some decisions that would indicate that Congress has the right to 
delegate the power of making rules and regulations, but there should be some limit as to the 
extent of those rules and regulations.”). 
 235. See Patten, supra note 39, at 376 (“Interpretative regulations comprise the largest and 
commonest variety [of Treasury Regulations].”). Note that I am not endorsing all of Patten’s 
ideas, just pointing out what his ideas were. 
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affiliated corporations had raged in the courts.236 In the Revenue Act 
of 1928, Congress decided to punt the problem to Treasury, and thus 
section 141 of the law specifically directed the “Commissioner, with 
the approval of the Secretary,” to “prescribe such regulations as he 
may deem necessary in order that the tax liability of an affiliated 
group of corporations . . . may be determined . . . in such manner as 
clearly to reflect the income and to prevent avoidance of tax.”237 Soon 
enough, Treasury revised Regulations 75, providing just such rules.238 
The consolidated return statute was truly an unprecedented 
rulemaking power.239 It was more than just another one of the many 
provisions in specific sections that gave the Commissioner or the 
Secretary the authority to issue rules. This was the power to decide 
whom to tax, a qualitatively different delegation than any that had 
come before. Accordingly, the drafting of Regulations 75 resembled 
what Congress does when writing legislation: the regulation writers 
held three days of hearings to receive public input before writing the 
regulation.240 Professor Kenneth Davis also suggested that it was the 
consolidated return statute that gave rise to Treasury’s theory that the 
distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations lay in 
the specificity of the rulemaking grant from Congress.241 
This move by Congress became much more common in post–
New Deal legislation. Contemporaries describe the period after 1933 
as “marked by an unprecedented delegation of power to the 
President and other executive officers to prescribe regulations.”242 The 
distinction between legislative regulations and interpretative 
regulations was quickly viewed as based on a notion of delegation of 
powers—a view which most administrative law professors still teach 
today.243  
 
 236. See generally J. Hardy Patten, The Consolidated Return—1929 Model, 7 NAT’L INCOME 
TAX MAG. 419 (1929). 
 237. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 141, 45 Stat. 791, 831. 
 238. See Patten, supra note 236, at 420.  
 239. See id. (describing Regulations 75 as “an innovation in Federal tax administration,” 
which “present[s] the first production of legislative regulations en masse”). 
 240. Id. at 420 & n.9. 
 241. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 91 (1959). This is the student 
version of Davis’s Administrative Law Treatise. 
 242. Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 259 
(1938) (footnotes omitted). 
 243. Both Professors Lederman and Hickman have given complete and thorough 
explorations of this concept in the context of the issue of authority. See generally Hickman, 
supra note 12; Lederman, supra note 54. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a tax lawyer writing in the mid 1920’s, J. Hardy Patten was of 
the opinion that most income-tax regulations were interpretative of 
the tax statutes and not legislative.244 Given the history detailed in this 
Article, it should not be surprising that the common view after 
enactment of the APA was the same, finding a doctrinal home in the 
idea that most Treasury Regulations fell into the APA’s 
“interpretative” category of rules. Professor Davis put it this way: 
“The great bulk of Treasury Regulations under the tax laws clearly 
are interpretative rules, not legislative rules, despite the provision 
of § 7805 . . . . Without the grant of power by § 7805, the power of the 
Secretary or his delegate would be the same . . . .”245  
Yet this common view made Treasury Regulations exceptional 
from the very start of the APA. Focus on the word “despite” in 
Professor Davis’s quote. It implies that a general grant of authority 
would normally result in legislative rules. That is certainly how 
administrative scholars of the time defined legislative rules. For 
example, Professor A.H. Feller put it this way: 
The legislative regulation is an exercise of a permissive authority to 
make a law to supplement or make effective the law passed by 
Congress. It is a response to the authorization: “the administrator 
may make such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out 
the provisions of this section . . . .”246 
If categorization of Treasury Regulations as “interpretative” is, in 
some sense, a pretextual fiction, it is one that has persisted.247 
Whether it should be abandoned because of changes in either tax 
administration or administrative-law concepts since the APA is the 
subject for future articles. The point of this Article has been to 
caution against what Professor Richard Pierce might call a 
“hypertextual” approach to the APA.248 Those who write in this area 
 
 244. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 245. DAVIS, supra note 241, at 87 (emphasis added). As others have well explained, some 
regulations issued pursuant to specific statutes, such as the consolidated return statutes, were 
viewed as subject to notice-and-comment process and were labeled “legislative.” Professor 
Lederman gives an excellent summary of the contemporary thinking. See Lederman, supra note 
54, at 654–59. 
 246. Feller, supra note 42, at 1320.  
 247. Professor Louis Eisenstein seemed to think so. See generally Eisenstein, supra note 42, 
at 509–24 (describing the categorization of Treasury Regulations as interpretative as a myth). 
 248. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to 
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752, 777–78 
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must not fall into the presentist fallacy of assuming that the terms of 
the APA contain meaning independent of history and of the 
administrative context to which they are applied. Certainly lessons 
from other areas of legal study, such as administrative law, can add 
great value to the study of tax administration.249 But it is not a one-
way street; it should be a two-way conversation. 
 
 
(1995) (criticizing the Court for relying too much on “the abstract meaning of a particular word 
or phrase” without considering other evidence of its meaning in a particular statute). 
 249. One outstanding example of this can be found in Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax 
Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 183 (1996). 
